Advance decisions, dementia and subsequent inconsistent behaviour: a call for greater clarity in the law. by Christie, Sarah
CHRISTIE, S. 2019. Advance decisions, dementia and subsequent inconsistent behaviour: a call for greater clarity in 
the law. Journal of medical law and ethics [online], 2019(1). Available from: 
https://www.uitgeverijparis.nl/en/reader/205341/1001426917  
Advance decisions, dementia and subsequent 
inconsistent behaviour: a call for greater clarity 
in the law. 
CHRISTIE, S. 
2019 
This document was downloaded from 
https://openair.rgu.ac.uk 
 
1 
 
Advance decisions, dementia and subsequent inconsistent 
behaviour: a call for greater clarity in the law 
 
Dr Sarah Christie, Academic Strategic Lead, The Law School, Robert 
Gordon University 
 
The Law School 
Robert Gordon University 
Garthdee Road 
Aberdeen 
AB10 7QE 
s.christie@rgu.ac.uk 
 
Word count - 5273 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Advance decisions, dementia and subsequent inconsistent 
behaviour: a call for greater clarity in the law 
 
This paper considers the interpretation of section 25(2)(c) of the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005, on the relevance of subsequent 
inconsistent behaviour by the maker of an advance decision. 
Consideration of the very few cases, and analysis of how existing 
rules of statutory interpretation could be applied, identifies a 
particular problem in relation to those who appear to contradict 
their own prior decision, but do so after they have lost capacity. 
This highlights an issue which has already been raised in the 
philosophical literature where there has been some discussion of the 
relevance and moral authority of our own prior decisions over our 
future selves, particularly where our future self appears content 
with a situation which would have been intolerable to our prior self. 
The incidence of cases of this type is not confined to the realms of 
philosophy; indeed these kinds of situations are likely to increase, 
given predictions of the rise in cases of dementia over the next 30 
years, and so we will require an unambiguous legal framework to 
deal with assessing the validity of an individual’s advance decision, 
and the ramifications of acting upon it. The law, as currently stated, 
is not clear in respect of these types of cases, and should be revised 
to provide clarity, and with it the greater confidence and uptake in 
advance planning desired by central government.  
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Advance Decisions, capacity and future decision-making  
“…exceptionally difficult moral, legal and ethical questions … may 
have to be addressed when a previously competent patient is in the 
‘twilight’ position of having lost his capacity to decide whether or 
not to accept medical treatment but nonetheless remains able, to a 
greater or lesser extent, to express his wishes and feelings. Is such 
a patient to be held to his advance directive even if it appears to 
conflict with his current (incompetent) wishes and feelings?”1 
 
Advance decisions2 have existed, with the force of law in England 
and Wales, for some time, and are designed to allow individuals to 
set out in advance their decisions about their own future treatment, 
should they be incapable of expressing themselves when the time 
comes. However, they are not without their controversies. A 
                                       
1 HE v. A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] EWHC 1017 (Fam) at para 38, fn 2 (per Lord 
Munby). 
2 Variously referred to as advance decisions or advance directives, but for the 
sake of consistency and clarity, I shall use the term “advance decisions” 
throughout. 
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contradictory action or statement by an individual made after they 
have drawn up such a document poses particular problems, and is 
the situation both alluded to above by Munby J., and (perhaps) 
resolved by s25(2)(c) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. However, I 
will argue that while this section may be satisfactory in cases such 
as HE quoted above, the underlying issue will present itself in other 
situations (specifically where the person exhibiting contradictory 
behaviour has now lost mental capacity). There is as yet little case 
law on the matter to help to cast light on the application of the 
section and since, as I will show, situations involving incompetent 
contradictory behaviour are not so readily addressed by the existing 
legislation, the wording of the relevant provision should be 
reconsidered. 
 
Advance planning has become an increasingly important part of 
medical, legal and social practice as individual autonomy has 
become more firmly entrenched, and as life expectancy increases. 
With this increase in average life expectancy has come an increase 
in conditions which are more prevalent in old age, in particular 
incidences of dementia. Alzheimer’s UK estimates over a million 
people will suffer with dementia by 2025, and two million by 20513, 
making it a major health priority. Dementia has particular relevance 
                                       
3 Alzheimer’s Society, Dementia UK report, 
http://www.alzheimers.org.uk/info/20025/policy_and_influencing/251/dementia_
uk 
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for issues of capacity and decision-making in law, and the extent to 
which an individual’s treatment decisions should be followed, 
particularly when an individual loses capacity because of dementia, 
and makes inconsistent and contradictory statements or behaviours 
which appear to fly in the face of their own advance decision. 
Although section 25(2)(c) exists, it has been subject to very little 
judicial comment, and none specifically in relation to the problem 
highlighted by Munby J above. However, given the figures just 
quoted on the predicted rise in cases of dementia over the next 30 
years, the incidence of legal disputes relating to dementia and 
decision-making will only increase, and the law should be better 
prepared to deal with it.  
 
It has for some time now been accepted that a competent adult’s 
decision in respect of their own treatment is sacrosanct, and a line 
of authorities now point to the absolute respect which must be 
granted to the autonomous adult’s decision to refuse treatment.4 
The Mental Capacity Act 20055 puts onto a statutory footing the 
concept of an advance decision, whereby a competent individual can 
set out their decisions to refuse specific future treatment options, 
                                       
4 See Re B (Adult, refusal of medical treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449, and St. 
George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S; R v Collins and others, ex parte S [1998] 3 
All ER 673. This includes an anticipatory refusal of treatment – see HE v NHS 
Trust A and AE [2003] EWHC 1017 (Fam) 
5 Sections 24 to 26, applicable to England and Wales only. Hereafter referred to 
as the MCA. 
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should particular circumstances arise after they have lost capacity6. 
On its introduction, the Government expressed their expectation 
that the Act would bring about “a quiet revolution in public attitudes 
and practice”7. However, while there is scope for this to have some 
impact in the arena of decision-making for those who are no longer 
competent, the incidence of use of such documents is relatively low. 
The British Social Attitudes Survey in 20128, when considering 
death and dying, noted that while 70% of respondents said that 
they felt comfortable talking about death9, fewer than 5% had 
indicated that they had a “living will” (i.e. an advance decision). 
This shows that the reported level of comfort with the topic of death 
did not lead to an equally high rate of reported discussions about 
death and end of life wishes, much less the formalising of this into a 
documentary statement of those wishes10. 
 
The problem of diminishing capacity  
Beyond the issue of uptake and usage by individuals, there are 
other aspects of advance decisions which remain controversial. The 
premise behind the law set out in the MCA is that the autonomous 
                                       
6 For example, an individual could use an advance decision to state that, in the 
future, if diagnosed with a terminal condition, and if unable to make or 
communicate their wishes in relation to life sustaining treatment, they do not 
wish such treatment to be started. 
7 HC Deb 4 July 1996, vol 280, col 68WS, per David Lammy. 
8 British Social Attitudes Survey 30 (2012) 
http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/media/38850/bsa_30_dying.pdf 
9 Ibid., p1. 
10 Ibid., p14. 
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decision of a competent adult is sacrosanct. In end of life issues, 
timelines and trajectories are seldom simple, and the blunt facts 
show that many adults will approach the end of life phase in a state 
of declining mental capacity, if not having already lost capacity. In 
such cases, it is notoriously difficult to predict the onset of a loss of 
capacity, and often that loss will not be exemplified in a single 
cataclysmic event during which the individual moves from having 
capacity, to losing capacity completely. Instead, capacity will 
gradually dwindle as the effects of dementia increase and so the 
individual’s capacity will manifest itself as a sliding scale. But once 
capacity is finally lost, so also goes autonomy, and therefore the 
ability for them to make any further decisions about medical 
treatment at that point in time. The purpose of advance decisions is 
to allow for this decision to have been taken earlier, at a time when 
they still had capacity. In doing so, it forms part of the concept of 
advance care planning, and further enables the pendulum-swing 
away from paternalism and towards person-centred care, and 
autonomous decision-making by the individual themselves. 
However, the nature of dementia is such that its effect on the 
individual can last for a considerable period, moving through phases 
as it increases in severity, and that the individual will retain the 
capacity to communicate, in some cases right to the end. With this 
come some thorny issues which require to be addressed, in 
particular the status of any statement made by the individual, after 
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they have lost capacity, which appears to contradict the essence, or 
indeed the substance, of their own earlier advance decision. This 
might, for example, come in the form of an expression of a 
determination to survive which contradicts an earlier advance 
decision rejecting life sustaining interventions once their condition 
had deteriorated beyond a certain point. As the incidence of 
dementia rises, the number of individuals in these situations will 
also increase, and we will require an unambiguous legal framework 
to deal with assessing the validity of an individual’s advance 
decision, and the ramifications of acting upon it.  
 
Borrowing for a moment from the well-known case of Margo11, as 
further discussed by Dworkin12, difficult issues arise in respect of 
those gradually losing first capacity, and then more general abilities 
as a result of conditions such as dementia. Margo’s case is the 
subject of considerable discussion in the ethical and philosophical 
literature, but the scenario identified by Firlik is one which will 
resonate with many who have experience of caring for those with 
advancing dementia. Firlik describes his contact with Margo in some 
detail, and in doing so, highlights some of the core problematic 
issues raised by dementia. He reports that she says she enjoys 
                                       
11 A. Firlik, “Margo’s Logo” 265 (1991) Journal of the American Medical 
Association 201. 
12 R. Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: an argument about abortion, euthanasia and 
individual freedom, New York. Random House. 1993 at p220. 
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reading books, but her bookmark jumps around from one random 
place in the book to another with no recollection of what page she 
has already read to; that she paints, but repeatedly paints the same 
abstract picture; that she professes to remember him when he 
visits but never uses his name; and that she still clearly derives 
enjoyment from aspects of her life; specifically lunchtime peanut 
butter and jelly sandwiches.13 The picture he presents, which is 
common among such patients, is one of a continuing decline from 
early stage dementia through to more advanced phases, 
characterised by increasing loss, over time, of memory, 
understanding and the ability to reason. The early stages are often 
marked by gradually increasing problems with short-term memory, 
confusion and difficulty planning or deciding. As the disease 
progresses, problems with memory loss and forgetfulness become 
more significant, and are often accompanied by elements of 
aggression, emotional distress, anger and agitation. Later stages of 
the disease are marked by issues such as profound memory loss, 
dependency on others, and significant difficulties with aspects of 
personal care14.  
 
                                       
13 ibid., at p221. 
14 Alzheimer’s Society, “How dementia progresses” available at 
https://www.alzheimers.org.uk/info/20073/how_dementia_progresses/1048/the_
progression_of_alzheimers_disease_and_other_dementias/3 
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Now imagine a situation where an individual makes an advance 
decision, stating that if they have lost capacity and have 
subsequently been diagnosed with cancer, they do not want any 
life-saving or life-sustaining treatment because they view life 
without competence, capacity and memory as intolerable and would 
not wish to go through intensive treatment for cancer in order to 
prolong their life with dementia. In the intervening years, they have 
made statements to family members and their GP, which are 
consistent with this remaining their clear decision. They are later 
diagnosed with dementia, and go into rapid decline, requiring them 
to move into a care home. Over time, it becomes clear that the 
dementia has taken hold to the extent that they have lost capacity, 
and require full personal care, and they have also been diagnosed 
as suffering from cancer. While it is true that they are suffering 
from a serious but treatable condition, it is also clear that they still 
enjoy aspects of daily life and in conversations with family and staff, 
have verbally expressed contentment with their situation. At no 
point while they retained capacity, did they revoke their advance 
decision. So, should they need life-saving or life-sustaining 
measures, what takes precedence – their earlier advance decision, 
drawn up while they had capacity, or their more recent expressions 
of happiness with their current situation, made after the loss of 
capacity? The crucial question becomes that of the effect of those 
apparently contradictory statements made in the grip of dementia.  
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The philosophical perspective 
While the law sets out criteria for validity, and asserts the primacy 
of advance decisions where they are valid and applicable to the 
circumstances, there remains debate about subsequent apparently 
contradictory statements in situations such as dementia, and what 
effect those statements have. Without diving too deeply into the 
philosophical underpinnings, it is worth highlighting briefly where 
different schools of thought stand on the concept of the prior 
authority of an earlier version of oneself. Dworkin asserts the 
significance of precedent autonomy, and gives the competent prior 
self’s interest in exercising autonomy precedence over any interests 
of the later incompetent self. He does so under an integrity view of 
autonomy, whereby what is respected and upheld is the competent 
individual’s sense of the shape and type of life they want to live 
out15. He distinguishes critical and experiential interests, and gives 
critical interests (hopes, beliefs, values) greater moral significance 
than experiential interests (things we do because we enjoy the 
experience of them)16. Advance decisions setting out how that 
individual wants to live out the rest of their life, in a way which 
reflects their consistent belief in a life of value to them, conform to 
those critical interests, and therefore (on the grounds of precedent 
                                       
15 Dworkin, op.cit., pp224-6. 
16 Ibid., p201ff 
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autonomy) have authority and determine what happens to the 
individual in those circumstances, once they have lost capacity. 
 
In this context, and contrary to Dworkin’s position, the concept of 
psychological connectedness or continuity is often used to assert 
that the person who makes the advance decision, and the later 
version of themselves who develops dementia, are insufficiently 
connected to allow for the decision to carry authority over that later 
person and determine what happens to them17. The psychological 
links between the different phases of our lives which link us into one 
continuing “person” include aspects such as memories, desires and 
beliefs, all of which fall by the wayside as dementia progresses. The 
argument put forward is that, once dementia takes hold, the person 
in question no longer has the same interests as the person who 
made the decision, or even that they are no longer the same 
person. This, it is argued, robs the advance decision of its moral 
authority, and that therefore any attempt to uphold an earlier 
decision to do something as critical as withholding life-sustaining 
treatment, cannot be carried out. Writers such as Robertson18 state 
that the values which underpin the advance decision taken prior to 
                                       
17 On this, see writers such as D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Oxford, OUP, 1986 
at pp206-7, and R. Dresser, “Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant Theory, Questionable 
Policy” in Kuhse, H., and Singer, P. (eds), Bioethics: an anthology, Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1999, p312. 
18 J. Robertson, “Second Thought on Living Wills” 21(6) 1991 Hastings Center 
Report 6 at p7. 
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the onset of dementia, no longer hold any place in the life of a 
person for whom those values no longer resonate, and that the shift 
from competence to incompetence is so radical that the focus must 
be on the individual’s interests now, as an incompetent person, not 
their prior advance decision. He does however assert that the 
person in question is still the same person, but with different 
interests. 
 
However, this is not the place to delve too far into these arguments. 
The MCA enshrines advance decisions into law. The issue here is the 
manner in which it does so, and the phrasing of particular sections 
which pose some difficult questions. 
 
A legal response – the words in the Act 
Section 24 of the MCA sets out the establishing principle that 
someone over 18 with capacity can reject specified treatment for 
themselves in the future, provided that the circumstances 
envisaged in the advance decision have arisen, and providing that 
they have, by that point in the future, lost capacity. Should such 
criteria be met, then the relevant treatment should not be 
undertaken. This is a clear statement of the nature and extent of 
the influence of autonomy. It allows a situation whereby an 
individual can envisage potential future circumstances and, 
depending on their values and beliefs, provide clear instructions in 
14 
 
advance to resolve the difficulty which would otherwise be faced; 
the need for proxy decision making, potentially life and death 
decision making, in the individual’s best interests. Since the purpose 
of an advance decision is that it should apply at some point in the 
future, it is designed to be a document with some, perhaps 
considerable, longevity. This raises the issues of its continuing 
validity. Like all documents drawn up by a competent individual, it 
cannot operate to tie the hands of its maker while they retain 
capacity. There is always the scope for that individual to alter or 
entirely revoke the advance decision. This is set out in section 25(2) 
which reads thus 
 
s25 Validity and applicability of advance decisions 
(2) An advance decision is not valid if P– 
(a) has withdrawn the decision at a time when he had capacity to 
do so, 
(b) has, under a lasting power of attorney created after the 
advance decision was made, conferred authority on the donee 
(or, if more than one, any of them) to give or refuse consent to 
the treatment to which the advance decision relates, or 
(c) has done anything else clearly inconsistent with the advance 
decision remaining his fixed decision. 
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While this subsection purports to set out criteria under which an 
individual can effectively nullify their own previous advance 
decision, there is a potential problem with the construction of 
s25(2)(c). If we cast our minds back, for a moment, to the 
hypothetical situation outlined above, that individual was apparently 
content in the care home, enjoyed aspects of their daily life, and 
had verbally expressed that contentment. Would this amount to 
something which meets the criteria set out in s25(2)(c)? A close 
look at the criteria set out in s25(2) shows some variation in the 
style of expression, but there is a key shared factor which applies 
to, at least parts (a) and (b). S25(2)(a) explicitly classifies an 
advance decision as invalid if the person who made it has 
withdrawn it at a time when they had capacity to do so. Thus a key 
criterion for rendering a decision invalid is capacity. Part (b) does 
not explicitly use the term “capacity” but refers instead to a 
situation where the person who made the advance decision 
subsequently grants a lasting power of attorney which empowers 
the donee to consent or refuse to consent to the same specified 
treatment as covered by the decision. Clearly this would invalidate 
the earlier advance decision as the person would have made other, 
specific provisions for decision-making on that issue in the future.19 
                                       
19 On this point, see Re E [2014] EWCOP 27, paras 43-50, where an individual’s 
advance decision became effective before her lasting power of attorney was 
recorded and became effective. The effect of this was that her lasting power of 
attorney, coming later, invalidated her previous advance decision, although the 
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The donee would be given the authority to decide on that particular 
treatment if the person themselves is, by then, incapable of 
deciding themselves. However, part (b) does share with part (a) 
that same key criterion of capacity. Although not mentioned 
specifically, the granting of a lasting power of attorney is an act 
which requires capacity, and so the act which invalidates the 
advance decision (the grant of that power) is also an act which 
requires that the person still retains capacity. 
 
So, in terms of interpreting the scope of s25(2), the means by 
which an advance decision can be withdrawn by the person who 
made it encompass two situations which clearly require that the 
person still has capacity. Those means of withdrawing an advance 
decision cannot be undertaken after the person has lost capacity as 
a result of, for example, advancing dementia. Thus, once that 
person has lost capacity, they remain bound by the terms of that 
decision, and by any refusal of treatment contained in it. The more 
problematic issue is s25(2)(c), which again does not explicitly 
mention capacity, but also does not, at least on the face of it, 
encompass a situation which automatically requires capacity before 
it could come about. Part (c) provides that an advance decision is 
not valid if the person has done anything else clearly inconsistent 
                                       
court here used its power under s26 to declare the advance decision valid, in 
order to ensure that her previously expressed wishes were not lost. 
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with it remaining their fixed decision. The term “anything else” is 
less clear that it might be. Does it mean “anything else at all”, or 
(like parts (a) and (b)) is it constrained by the concept of capacity 
and does it therefore mean “anything else while they retained 
capacity”?  
 
The implications of this are stark. To return again, for a moment, to 
our earlier example, the real crux of the issue here is the relevance 
of those statements made by the person, after they have lost 
capacity, which appear to contradict the terms of the advance 
decision. What effect, if any, must be given to them? If the first 
interpretation is correct, then the contradictory statements made 
after they lost capacity overrule the earlier advance decision. If the 
latter interpretation is taken, then the contradictory statements are 
not given any effect and the earlier advance decision stands.  
 
The meaning of the words in the Act 
With a question about the scope and application of s25(2)(c) in 
mind, we can now turn to the rules on statutory interpretation and 
other guides, to see if this can cast any further light on its meaning. 
There are a well-known set of rules of statutory interpretation, 
which begin with an acknowledgment that the first port of call 
should be the plain ordinary meaning of the provision. It is only if 
that meaning is contrary to the purpose of the statute and the 
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intention of Parliament, that further work is required. The plain, 
ordinary meaning of s25(2)(c) could be argued to be “done 
anything else at all”, and since the purpose of the MCA, as identified 
in the Code of Practice, is to allow individuals to make preparations 
for a time when they will lack capacity in the future, it would seem 
that the plain, ordinary meaning runs contrary to the purpose of the 
statute. 
 
Statutory language must be interpreted in its context, as was made 
clear in Attorney-General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover20 
where Viscount Simonds held that “…words, and particularly general 
words, cannot be read in isolation; their colour and their content are 
derived from their context”. This finds expression in the noscitur a 
sociis rule which specifies that general words (and here I would 
contend that “anything else” is sufficiently general to fall under this) 
are to be coloured and shaped by their context, and by that with 
which they are associated. By virtue of being grouped under a 
single subsection, and being clearly designated as three means by 
which an advance decision will not be valid, it would suggest that 
the constituent parts of section 25(2) are all associates of each 
other. In s25(2), both parts (a) and (b) provide a particular kind of 
context; acts by which a person can render their own earlier 
                                       
20 [1957] AC 436 at p461.  
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advance decision invalid, and specifically, acts by which a person 
who has capacity (and only a person with capacity) can so render. 
Since part (a) specifies capacity and part (b) cannot be achieved 
without capacity, this then raises the implication that, following the 
noscitur rule, part (c) takes its colour and shape from that same 
context. In other words, that the noscitur rule requires part (c) to 
be interpreted as meaning “any other act done while that person 
retains capacity”. But that is not the only guide we can consider 
here. The eiusdem generis rule also states that subsequent general 
words or phrases are to be understood in the context of more 
specific words, such that general words appended to the end of a 
list of specifics, sharing a particular element, are construed in the 
light of that shared element. So, classically speaking, a phrase such 
as “eggs, milk, cream and other foodstuffs” includes butter, but not 
bread. Again, here, this can be used to interpret part (c) as being 
confined to other acts also done while the person retained capacity, 
since that is the shared criterion which is common to both part (a) 
and part (b). The purpose of the eiusdem generis rule is to identify 
where there is a series of things expressed in a statute which can 
be identified as species within a genus; that is to say, identifiable 
things recognised as belonging to a broader category. It then 
follows that subsequent general words are to be interpreted as also 
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belonging to that same genus.21 The statutory series which can be 
identified here is of two instances in s25(2)(a) and (b), of ‘things 
requiring capacity’ (the genus) and thus the general words which 
follow in s25(2)(c) should also be construed in the same way. The 
application of this rule is, however, subject to the court’s duty to 
have regard to the purpose of the statute and thus, if the purpose 
of the statute required the general words which followed, to be 
interpreted more widely than the identified genus, the eiusdem 
generis rule is defeated. The purpose of the MCA is expressed in the 
Code of Practice in the following terms. It “…provides a statutory 
framework for people who lack capacity to make decisions for 
themselves, or who have capacity and want to make preparations 
for a time when they may lack capacity in the future”22. If the 
eiusdem generis rule were not applied, and part (c) were given its 
widest meaning (anything at all done at any time, before or after 
the loss of capacity), then this would allow apparently contradictory 
statements made after the loss of capacity to undermine the precise 
purpose of the MCA, as such statements would prevent the 
instigation of the very measures the individual had put in place 
                                       
21 See J. Bell and G. Engle, Cross on Statutory Interpretation, 3rd edn, 
Butterworths, London, 1995 at pp135-7, and Attorney-General v. Brown [1920] 1 
KB 773. 
22 Mental Capacity Act 2005 Code of Practice, p1, available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/att
achment_data/file/497253/Mental-capacity-act-code-of-practice.pdf. 
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some time previously, in order to deal with a future onset of 
incapacity. 
 
 
Rules of statutory interpretation also require that a statute is read 
as a whole, looking at all other parts of the Act, and here we find 
statements such as that in s24(3) (“P may withdraw or alter an 
advance decision at any time when he has capacity to do so”). The 
Explanatory Notes to the Act do not cast any light on the 
interpretation of part (c) in this context, as they focus on examples 
taken from existing case law, such as that of the Jehovah’s witness 
who made an advance decision rejecting blood products of all types, 
and subsequently rejected that faith, converted to Islam and 
married in that new faith. While these were clearly evidence of 
having done “anything else” which indicated that she viewed her 
advance decision as no longer her fixed decision, these remain acts 
which she carried out while retaining full capacity, and so can be 
distinguished from the kind of problem case we are considering. The 
Mental Capacity Act Code of Practice gives an example of a part (c) 
type situation by envisaging someone who makes an advance 
decision to refuse particular treatment and then later specifically 
gives their competent consent for that same treatment.23 Indeed, 
                                       
23 Mental Capacity Act 2005 Code of Practice p170, available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/att
achment_data/file/497253/Mental-capacity-act-code-of-practice.pdf. 
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the example given in the Code of Practice specifically refers to 
someone making a contradictory statement (authorising treatment 
in the face of the advance decision), while they still retained 
capacity and so casts no further light on the situation envisaged 
here. The evidence points towards finding that the purpose behind 
the provisions here is to empower those who choose to do so, to 
make advance decisions which will be binding at a later date if they 
meet the requirements for validity and applicability. To allow for a 
situation where a condition which will affect so many in their later 
years, and which is characterised by a loss of capacity and therefore 
the potential for making contradictory statements without legal 
capacity, to invalidate an advance decision seems to defeat the 
purpose of the provisions in ss24-26. This is borne out in In re 
Briggs (Incapacitated Person) (Medical Treatment: Best Interests 
Decision) (No 2)24 where, in a brief discussion of section 25(2)(c), 
Charles J notes that the section does not specify whether capacity is 
required at the time of the inconsistent behaviour. He goes on to 
state that if the section was indeed meant to set a low threshold 
and make it easy to invalidate an advance decision, favouring 
preservation of life over prior competently-expressed decisions, that 
would run contrary to the intention of the MCA in respect of 
advance decisions.  
 
                                       
24 [2016] EWCOP 53 at para 22. 
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A note of considerable caution 
This would all seem to point to an interpretation of part (c) as 
meaning “has done anything else while they retained capacity which 
is clearly inconsistent with the advance decision remaining their 
fixed intention”. However, the addition of the section in italics is not 
without its own problems. Whether or not it can be said that the 
application of long-standing and accepted aids to statutory 
interpretation mean that any other contradictory act or statement 
by the person is only effective in invalidating the previous advance 
decision if the person still has capacity, the implications of this are 
fairly stark. 
 
Such an interpretation would involve taking someone like Margo, or 
the person we envisaged at the outset of this piece, acknowledging 
their current state as one in which, despite having been robbed of 
their capacity, they are apparently content and have verbally or 
non-verbally expressed this, and then denying that there is any 
effect flowing from their current contented situation. This would be 
contentious, as the advance decision would still be viewed as 
operative, and should the situation envisaged and provided for in 
the decision materialise, the advance decision should determine 
that treatment is not offered or is discontinued. Thus the individual, 
apparently content with their current situation, would be denied 
24 
 
potentially life-saving treatment for their cancer, and may therefore 
die sooner, because their advance decision stands. 
 
The difficult position which s25(2) leaves us in is that it, along with 
ss24 and 26, is clearly designed to allow those who choose to do so, 
the means to give effect to their beliefs and values, and their 
autonomous right to choose for themselves in the future when they 
have become incapacitated. And yet s25(2) sets up an internal 
contradiction; interpreted solely on the basis of the plain meaning of 
the words used, part (c) defeats that purpose by requiring the 
advance decision to be rendered invalid by expressions which 
contradict the terms of the decision, made after capacity has been 
lost. This means, to put it bluntly, that anything done by the person 
after the loss of their capacity can derail the purpose of the advance 
decision which was made while they had capacity, to provide a 
clear, competent, value-driven decision to stand in the place of their 
own later incapacity. On the other hand, to interpret part (c) using 
the aids to construction, instead of its plain ordinary meaning, 
means that clinical teams, family and friends are faced with a 
situation where expressions of contentment by the person for whom 
they care, and whom they love, are disregarded in the face of the 
prior authority of the advance decision. In practical terms, this is an 
unenviable choice but one which the law as currently expressed 
does nothing to clarify. 
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Concluding thoughts and a call for (more) clarity 
Where then does this leave us? As currently expressed, a plain 
meaning interpretation of the law in section 25(2)(c) allows a 
contradictory statement made by someone who has lost capacity, to 
override the validity of their earlier advance decision. No-one would 
wish to suggest that in the kinds of circumstances envisaged in this 
discussion, any expression of current wishes which ran contrary to 
the terms of an advance decision, should be completely 
disregarded, particularly where the current statement is one 
expressing contentment and a desire to continue living, while the 
advance decision dictates, for example, the refusal of heroic life-
saving treatment. Indeed, in the context of decision-making on the 
basis of best interests under section 4 of the Act, both past and 
present wishes and feelings are to be taken into account in utilising 
the balance sheet approach to best interests (although how one 
proceeds with this balancing exercise when past and present wishes 
are contradictory is another question). The language of the law is, 
however, unhelpful in section 25(2)(c). The purpose of sections 24 
to 26 of the MCA is to allow for patient autonomy and self-
determination, and for decision-making in respect of treatment to 
be vested in the hands of the individual themselves, who is able to 
refuse future treatment, if they choose to create a valid advance 
decision. The language used in section 25(2)(c) – that an advance 
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decision is not valid if the individual has done anything else clearly 
inconsistent with the advance decision remaining his fixed decision 
– avoids specifying whether the inconsistency has to arise before 
the loss of capacity takes hold. It appears on the face of it to allow 
for inconsistent statements made both before and after the loss of 
capacity to have this invalidating effect, but without stating as much 
in explicit terms. Given the significance of this interpretation of 
section 25(2)(c), absolute clarity would be more helpful. If it is 
designed to allow incompetent contradictory statements to 
invalidate the earlier autonomous decision of the individual, then it 
should say so explicitly. If it is not so intended, then it should 
equally explicitly state the continuation of precedent autonomy and 
the fact that the prior advance decision stands, regardless of the 
contradictory statements if they arise after the onset of incapacity. 
In determining which interpretation should be taken, an underlying 
decision is necessary. If the individual, once they have lost capacity, 
makes no contradictory statements, we need to decide whether we 
are prepared to see their precedent autonomy, exercised through 
the existence of an advance decision, carried through. The existence 
of ss24-26 of the MCA suggest that, as a society, we are accepting 
of this principle. If the individual who has lost capacity does make 
contradictory statements, we have to decide whether we are 
prepared to still uphold that precedent autonomy expressed through 
the advance decision, and disregard those statements, or whether 
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we would instead view the existence of those contradictory 
statements as something which overrides precedent autonomy, and 
is a trigger for best interests decision-making. 
 
If the latter route is the one we, as a society, would prefer to take, 
then it requires greater clarity in the law. As it stands, the purpose 
behind this part of the MCA is the promotion of patient autonomy, 
including making decisions for their own future. If we take the latter 
interpretation of s25(2)(c), then we dilute that autonomy by 
allowing statements made after the loss of capacity to override the 
individual’s own advance decision. Whichever way we wish to 
proceed, the wording of the section is not helpful in its lack of 
clarity as to whether the context (that of an individual with 
capacity) covers all three subsections, or only the first two.  
 
A recommendation 
I would suggest that, before the Act can effect the “quiet 
revolution” in advance care planning envisaged by the Government, 
greater attention needs to be paid to the precise construction borne 
by specific sections, and that section 25(2)(c) should explicitly state 
when such inconsistent acts should have taken place in order for 
them to invalidate the advance decision. The re-phrasing of section 
25(2)(c) to read “has done anything else while they retained 
capacity, which is clearly inconsistent with the advance decision 
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remaining his fixed decision” would clarify the position, and would 
allow individuals to be absolutely clear about the long-term 
implications of their advance decision for their own care. This, in 
turn, would lead perhaps to both a greater public confidence in such 
documents, and greater uptake, both of which are clear priorities in 
the increasing pressing area of elder care and end of life medicine. 
The law both can, and should, play its role in helping to achieve 
over-arching goals, and in this particular situation, can do so by 
adopting a legal framework which is more robust and explicit, in 
advance of such cases becoming increasingly prevalent as the 
population ages disproportionately, and dementia cases rise as 
predicted. 
 
 
 
